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COMMENTARY:
*

PUBLIC SECTOR GRIEVANCE ARBITRATION:
RIGHT OR PRIVILEGE?
by Arthur S. Leonard*

Arbitration by a neutral party is now firmly established as the preferred
method for resolving grievances over the interpretation of contract terms
which arise in the private sector. As public sector collective bargaining
has increased in recent years, this private sector mechanism for rights
dispute settlement has been adapted to the new sphere, frequently at the
express urging of state legislatures in their public employee labor relations
statutes. Grievance arbitration is normally the final step in an extended
grievance procedure, and it is invoked when the parties to the dispute
cannot come to terms through direct negotiation on several levels. Unions,
of their own volition, do not process every unresolved grievance through to
arbitration. Some grievances are redundant (i.e., similar grievances have
been lost so many times that pressing them appears to be futile), some represent a clear misunderstanding of contract language by the employee, and
some are frivolous or petty complaints that do not seem to the union to
justify the expense of arbitration. Also, unions occasionally decide not
to press a grievance as a bargaining tactic or in response to the internal
political situation of the union. The argument is occasionally heard that
public sector employees should have a right to have their grievances
pressed to arbitration, due mainly to their lack of a right to strike in
most jurisdictions. Should every individual employee in the public sector
have the right to press his grievance.to arbitration?
In deciding whether such a right ought to exist, this writer finds four questions of major importance, and will deal with each of them in turn. (1) Do
private sector employees have such a right, and if not why not? (2) Is there
a qualitative difference between public and private sectors which would justify different treatment? (3) Is such a right necessary to effectuate the purposes of public sector collective bargaining? (4) Does the individual employee
have a binding claim on the union to process all his grievances as a matter
of fairness or equity?
*Arthur S. Leonard, a senior in the New York State School of
Industrial and Labor Relations, is Editor of this journal.
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The Private Sector1
The federal courts have held that a union may refuse to process
employee's grievance for a variety of reasons, including the union's
judgment that the grievance cannot be won, that the case is without
merit, or that pursuit of the grievance would not be in the best interests
of the union. There are, however, special circumstances in which an
individual can compel grievance arbitration. The individual has a
special burden to show that the union's refusal to process the grievance
was due to discrimination of the sort made illegal by federal law. A
union may settle a grievance short of arbitration by compromising the
claims of the individual grievant, as long as this settlement, once again,
does not single the employee out to lose rights guaranteed him by federal
law. Under the Labor Management Relations Act (1947), individual
employees have a right to approach the employer on their own initiative
to present~a grievance, but they cannot compel arbitration due to the
legal status of arbitration. Arbitration is a binding device created by
the contract between the union and the employer; since the-employer's
obligation under the contract is to enter into arbitration only with the
union, the individual employee must persuade the union to process his
case if he is to compel the employer to honor this obligation.
The courts have developed an Exhaustion of Remedies Doctrine which
requires that employees covered by a collective bargaining agreement
utilize the grievance machinery established by that'contract, thus delaying
access to arbitration even in those cases where an employee can prove a
wrongful refusal of the union to process his grievance. Thus, an employee
is obliged to give the union a chance to decide whether to process the
grievance and even to settle the grievance short of arbitration before the
employee can sue in federal court to compel the union to process his grievance.
In sum, then, individual employees in the private sector have no absolute
right to have their grievances.processed, although in a limited variety of
cases involving alleged violations of the union's duty to fairly represent
all employees in a unit the federal courts will entertain suits to compel
unions to process individual grievances.
Why this restriction on rights? The answer is at least partly financial.
Grievance arbitration is an expensive process; in addition to hiring an
arbitrator (whose fee may run from $100 to over $400 a day), unions and
employers routinely hire legal counsel to prepare and present their cases
due to the increasingly legalistic quality of grievance arbitration. The
courts have found that requiring unions to procpss all the grievances they
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receive would impdse a severe financial burden on the unions. In terms of
dispute settlement, it is preferable that the bulk of grievances be resolved
at a lower step than arbitration; informal resolution of grievances may
avoid the bitter polarizing effect of hiring lawyers and arguing a case before
a neutral, and will also result in a speedier resolution of the grievance,
since a shortage of trained arbitratbrs has resulted in substantial delays
between the decision to go to arbitration and the actual hearing of cases.
Additionally, the union's chief responsibility is to the welfare of the bargaining unit as a whole. To require the. union to process a grievance which
might in its opinion be detrimental to the collective interests of the employees
in the unit would be to require the union to purposely abrogate its overall
responsibility. This consideration takes into account the internal political
nature of the union; the elected union officials who make decisions on
whether to process a grievance have constituencies to think about, and
the theory of union democracy implicit in our national labor policy holds
that the interests of the unit are best served when the union is at the same
time sensitive to.the interests of the majority without discriminating unduly
against the interests of the minority. This policy of placing majority interests first is part of the definition of union democracy; it assumes that in
the absence of the union neither the majority nor the minority would enjoy
many union-won privileges and benefits. Thus, it is only right that the
courts have allowed,individual to compel arbitration of their own grievances
only in a narrowly defined class of cases in which a heavy burden is placed
upon the individual to show that failure to compel arbitration tri his case
would seriously interfere with hil rights under federal law.
Public Sector v. Private Sector
There are differences in the nature of the employment relationship between
the public and private sectors, but this writer does not find them to be such
as to require a different treatment for public sector grievants demanding
arbitration.
As in the private sector, the tool of grievance arbitration becomes part of
a public sector collective bargaining relationship as a result of its inclusion
in an agreement between union and employer, from which the same legal
obligations flow as were present in the private sector. The individual employee
is a concerned party in the relationship, but it is the union rather than the
individual which establishes a mutual obligation with the employer to settle
unresolved grievances through arbitration. Despite differences as to methods
of hiring, assignment, and discharge, or tenure, promotion, and scope of
contract bargaining, the essential nature of this triangklar relationship between employee, union, and employer remains relatively constant as between
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the public and private sectors in terms of grievance settlement; private
sector rulings as to the responsibilities of unions to their menbers carry
the same force of logic when applied to the public sector. Additionally,
the argument about the lack of a right to strike in the public sector seems,
in the opinion of the writer, to have little relevance to the problem at
hand, since it is the union as a whole rather than the individual employee
that makes a strike determination in either sector; wildcat strikes over
individual grievances would have no more legailty in the private sector
than they do in the public sector.
The existence of alternative routes to grievance settlement in the public
sector also weakens the case for automatic access to jurisdiction.
Many jurisdictions give employees access to civil service review procedures for their job-related complaints. Thus, an employee whose union
representative has decided against'pressing his grievance may not have
to give up the grievance entirely. Of course, in many jurisdictions collective agreements, with their dispute settlement procedures, have been
held by statute or court determination to supercede conflicting or overlapping state legislation, so that this alternative route is limited to
only those jurisdictions where no such limitation exists.
Additionally, collective bargaining in the public sector is a relatively
new phenomenon. Many public sector unions are not far past the organizing and recognition phases. Treasuries are relatively small and experience and resources more limited than in the private sector labor movement.
These unions frequently are less able to afford the expense and diversion
of time represented by arbitration than are private sector unions. In addition, many issues regarding arbitrability and remedy are as yet unsettled
in the public sector, and unions may prefer to concentrate on bringing
grievances in those areas where they have a special interest in obtaining
clarification of the law. Since their resources are limited, they cannot
be expected and should not be forced to diffuse those resources on every
grievance that comes along. As in the private sector, it is undoubtedly
better from an industrial relations perspective that the bulk of grievances
be settled short of arbitration, and the union is probably the best mechanism available for screening grievances and selecting those to be processed
all the way through the procedure. Since the overriding interest of union
officials will be in satisfying the majority of their constituents, the broad
representative responsibilities given to unions by law are best served if
the unions are free to make representative decisions without having to
shoulder excessive financial burdens which could undermine the effectiveness of the unions in representing the collective interests of unit employees.
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Policy and Equity
A primary goal of public sector collective bargaining is peaceful labor
relations.- This is especially important in the public sector because of
the essential nature of many public services to the general health and
welfare of the jurisdiction; , thus the prohibition of strikes in most public
sector jurisdictions as compared to the right to strike in the private sector limited only by national emergency situations. Integral to this goal
is the expeditious settlement of grievances through a procedure mutually
acceptable to the public employer and the employees with whom it deals
dollectively. Avoidance of bitterness and polarization in this relationship are ideal considerations to achieve in the public interest. Thus,
peaceful settlement of grievances should be achieved whenever possible
short of arbitration. Incorporating guaranteed arbitration into the present
dispute settlement system might have the effect of reducing the willingness
of. grievants to compromise and settle short of arbitration. If every Individual knows that he can pursue his case through to arbitration -- and one
assumes that every grievant believes he has a meritorious case -- then
there is no incentive to compromise; the individual could reasonably
believe

that

by

holding

out

until

arbitration

he

will

score

a

complete

victory in his case. The absolute number and the relative number of cases
going to arbitration would likely increase, further straining the resources
of unions and.increasing the demands for arbitrators, which already outpace
the supply. As a result, a severe backlog of polarizing, divisive grievances
might accumulate, poisoning collective bargaining relationships in the,
public sector and militating against peaceful labor relations. Thus, a
requirement that all grievants be guaranteed arbitration might have an
effect running directly counter to public policy.
Finally, one turns to the morality Qf the situation. Is there a persuasive
argument that individuals have a claim on the union to process all their
grievances to arbitration? This writer thinks not, for such a claim would
run counter to the best interests of the unit as a whole. We have shown
that such a right could severely tax the resources of the union and would
thus endanger its effectiveness and even its existence. Absent a union,
the individual has no chance of arbitration, as the arbitration mechanism
exists as a legally enforceable device in the context of a functioning collective bargaining relatioriship. With a union, the individual has a chance
to have his grievance processed to arbitration if the unions finds that the
grievance is meritorious and worth pursuing. Thus, the individual is better off in this sense with a union than without a union. Since an individual
would have less protection for his rights without a union, an argument that
he should be entitled to pursue his individual grievance when such pursual
might undermine the overall functioning of the union falls under its own
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weight of illogic. The individual's rights must be balanced against the
rights of all individuals in the unit; the majority have an equitable
claim to union representation. Public policy authorizes the negotiation
of grievance procedures with a view to improving the situation of two
collectivities -- the public and the employees acting collectively.
Since the costs of pursuing arbitration are far out of proportion to the
individual's own financial contribution to the union in terms of dues,
the unit as a whole has an equitable collective claim to be able to make
the decision whether to process the grievance. Allowing individuals to
finance the processing of their own grievances is not a reasonable solution to the cost problem because the high costs of grievance arbitration
would result in denying access to arbitration on the basis of individual
income rather than the merits of the case. In the small number of cases
where the individual employee can show that he is suffering the loss of
substantial rights guaranteed by law due to the union's refusal wrongfully to process his grievance, the individual can equitably claim that
the union should be compelled to process the grievance. Absent this
sort of claim, there is no equitable claim by an individual that his collective representative should cater to the whims of each employee acting
as an individual.
Conclusion
We have argued that there should not be an absolute right to arbitration of
grievances for public sector employees. Such a right might work against
public policy by undermining the ability of unions to pursue their statutory
functions; further, no such right exists in the private sector and this writer
finds no evidence that the union-employee-employer relationship in this
respect is different in the public sector in a way that would justify preferential treatment for public sector employees. Finally, we have shown
that claims based on equity fall in the face of the combined claims of the
collective interests of the public and of the whole body of employees in
the unit, as represented by the union. Of course, parallel to this denial
of a right to grievance arbitration goes the imposition of a duty to represent equally and fairly all employees in the unit, whose breach should
result in waiving the union's right to decide not to process a grievance.
Taken as a whole, however, grievance arbitration of individual disputes
in the public sector is indeed a privilege rather than an individual right,
and this is as it should be.
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Note
1. This admittedly brief and rough summary of individual rights to
grievance arbitration in the private sector is based on the following
court decisions:
Decisions of U. S. Courts of Appeals:
Black-Clawson*Co. v. I.A.M., 313 F.2d 179 (2nd Cir., 1962)
NLRB v. Miranda Fuel Co., 326 F.2d 72 (2nd Cir., 1963)
Local 12 v. NLRB, 368 F. 2d 12 (5th Cir., 1966), cert. den.,
389 U.S. 837 (1967)
Decision of the U. S. Supreme Court:
Vaca v. Sipes, 386 U.S. 171 (1967)

